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A LINDSTRO¨M THEOREM FOR INTUITIONISTIC
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Abstract. It is shown that propositional intuitionistic logic is the maximal (with
respect to expressive power) abstract logic satisfying a certain topological property
reminiscent of compactness, the Tarski union property and preservation under
asimulations.
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1. Introduction
The well-known characterization of classical first-order logic by Per Lindstro¨m (pub-
lished as [15]) has had a great deal of repercussion in contemporary logic. The key devel-
opment inspired by that paper was the introduction of a notion of “extended first-order
logic” that encompassed a great number of expressive extensions of first order logic1
which let Lindstro¨m establish, roughly, that there were no extensions of classical first
order logic that would also satisfy the compactness and Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorems.
A nice accessible exposition can be found in [10].
Lindstro¨m’s theorem single-handedly started a new area of research known as ab-
stract or soft model theory (cf. [1, 2]). These two adjectives are used since, when
working in this field, one finds themself using “only very general properties of the
logic, properties that carry over to a large number of other logics” ([1], p. 225). Some
common examples of such properties are compactness, the Craig interpolation theorem
or the Beth definability theorem.
Naturally, there is no reason why one could not do non-classical abstract model
theory as well, this time focusing on some non-classical logic and its structures. An
interesting survey of this much less developed field can be found in [12]. The most
prominent work has been done in the case of modal logic. A succession of increasingly
improved results were obtained by a number of authors such as de Rijke ([6]), van Ben-
them ([21]), Otto and Piro ([20]) and, more recently, Enqvist ([8]). Indeed, Enqvist’s
result is a bit more general than the others and it serves as inspiration for this paper.
It roughly states that the basic modal language is the most expressive logic (over any
class of relational models axiomatizable in first order logic by a collection of strict Horn
formulas) satisfying the so called Tarski union property, invariance under bisimilarity
and compactness.
1This was soon replaced by the now more common term “abstract logic”. In fact, probably the term
“model-theoretic language” ([9]) is more accurate, depending on one’s views of what a “logic” is.
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The goal of this paper is to obtain a theorem in the vein of Enqvist but for intu-
itionistic models, an intuitionistic language, replacing invariance under bisimulation
for preservation under asimulations and compactness by a topological property more
suited to a boolean negationless context. The notion of an asimulation was introduced
in [16]2 and used to characterize the expressive power of intuitionistic languages as
fragments of first order logic over any class of structures axiomatizable by a first order
theory. Later the notion of asimulation was modified to capture also expressive powers
of intuitionistic first-order logic [17], various systems of basic intuitionistic modal logic
[18], and also some systems which are not connected with intuitionistic logic at all [19].
Our work will be of interest not only because it deals with probably the second
most famous non-classical logic but because it will be a contribution to abstract model
theory without Boolean negation, a subfield where not many results are known.
The layout of the remaining part of the present paper is then as follows. In Section 2
we establish the main bits of our notation and define some basic concepts. Section 3 is
then devoted to proving some less immediate lemmas on intuitionistic unravellings and
intuitionistically saturated models. In Section 4 we define the notion of an abstract
intuitionistic logic and formulate our main result. We prove such result in the next
section. In Section 6 we provide topological interpretation of the main theorem. We
end the paper by suggesting some lines of further inquiry.
2. Preliminaries
In this paper, we consider the language of intuitionistic propositional logic, which
we identify with its set of formulas. This language is generated from some set of
propositional letters by a finite number of applications of connectives from the set
{⊥,⊤,∧,∨,→}; the connectives are assumed to have they usual arities. The set of
propositional letters can be in general arbitrary large, but we assume that it is disjoint
from the above set of connectives (and from the set of logical symbols of every logic
which we are going to consider below). Any set with this property we will call vocab-
ulary. Intuitionistic propositional formulas will be denoted with Greek letters like ϕ,
ψ and θ,3 whereas the elements of vocabularies will be denoted by letters p, q, and r.
If Θ is a vocabulary, then IL(Θ) denotes the set of those intuitionistic propositional
formulas which only contain propositional letters from Θ.
For this language, we assume the standard Kripke semantics. The typical notations
for intuitionistic Kripke models that we are going to use below are as follows:
M = 〈W,R, V 〉,M′ = 〈W ′, R′, V ′〉,Mn = 〈Wn, Rn, Vn〉,
N = 〈U, S, Y 〉,N ′ = 〈U ′, S′, Y ′〉,Nn = 〈Un, Sn, Yn〉,
where n ∈ ω. As we proceed, we will also define some operations on intuitionistic
Kripke models which are going to affect the notation.
If Θ is a vocabulary and M is an intuitionistic Kripke Θ-model, then W is a non-
empty set of worlds, states, or nodes, R is a pre-order on W called M’s accessibility
2It was an independent rediscovery in somewhat different clothing of the notion of an intuitionistic
directed bisimulations from [14].
3We will be adjoining to them subscripts and superscripts when needed, and the same is assumed for
any other notations introduced in this paper.
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relation, and V is the evaluation function for Θ in M, that is to say, a function
V : Θ→ 2W such that for every p ∈ Θ and arbitrary s, t ∈ W , it is true that:
w R v ⇒ (w ∈ V (p)⇒ v ∈ V (p)).
IfM andN are two intuitionistic Kripke Θ-models then we say thatM is a submodel
of N and write M ⊆ N iff W ⊆ U , R = S ↾ (W × W ) and, for every p ∈ Θ,
V (p) = Y (p)∩W . In general, for every W ⊆ U there exists a corresponding submodel
M of N with W as its universe. In such cases we may also denote M by N (W ).
If M1 ⊆, . . . ,⊆Mn ⊆, . . . is a countable chain of intuitionistic Kripke models then
the model: ⋃
n∈ω
Mn = (
⋃
n∈ω
Wn,
⋃
n∈ω
Rn,
⋃
n∈ω
Vn)
is again an intuitionistic Kripke model.
A pointed intuitionistic Kripke Θ-model is a pair of the form (M, w) such that
w ∈ W . In this paper, we are not going to consider any non-intuitionistic Kripke
models. Therefore, we will omit the qualification ‘intuitionistic Kripke’ in what follows
and will simply speak about (pointed) Θ-models. We assume the standard satisfaction
relation for IL(Θ):
M, w |=IL pn ⇔ w ∈ V (pn), for n ∈ N;
M, w |=IL ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔M, w |=IL ϕ and M, w |=IL ψ;
M, w |=IL ϕ ∨ ψ ⇔M, w |=IL ϕ or M, w |=IL ψ;
M, w |=IL ϕ→ ψ ⇔ ∀v(w R v ⇒ (M, v 6|=IL ϕ or M, v |=IL ψ));
M, w 6|=IL ⊥;
M, w |=IL ⊤.
note that the formulas of IL(Θ) get satisfied at pointed Θ-models rather than at models
alone.
Since classical negation is not available in intuitionistic logic, intuitionistic theories
are often defined to include falsehood assumptions along with truth assumptions (this
is done in e.g. [11, p. 110] w.r.t. intuitionistic first-order logic). Thus an IL(Θ)-theory
becomes a pair (Γ,∆) ∈ 2IL(Θ) × 2IL(Θ), where formulas in Γ are assumed to be true
and formulas from ∆ are assumed to be false. If (M, w) is a pointed Θ-model, then
we define ThIL(M, w), the IL(Θ)-theory of (M, w), as follows:
ThIL(M, w) := ({ϕ ∈ IL(Θ) | M, w |=IL ϕ}, {ϕ ∈ IL(Θ) | M, w 6|=IL ϕ}).
We also introduce a special notation for the left and right projection of ThIL(M, w),
that is to say, for the positive and for the negative part of this theory, denoting them
by Th+IL(M, w) and Th
−
IL(M, w), respectively. Inclusion of intuitionistic theories must
then involve set-theoretic inclusion of their respective projections, so that we define:
(Γ,∆) ⊆ (Γ′,∆′)⇔ Γ ⊆ Γ′ and ∆ ⊆ ∆′.
It is clear then that an IL(Θ)-theory (Γ,∆) is IL-satisfiable iff we have (Γ,∆) ⊆ ThIL(M, w)
for some pointed Θ-model (M, w). In this case we will also write M, w |=IL (Γ,∆). If
M⊆ N and for every w ∈ W it is true that ThIL(M, w) = ThIL(N , w), then we say
that M is an IL-elementary submodel of N and write M 4IL N .
We end this section with some definitions and brief discussion of asimulations and
some other related notions relevant to the subject of this paper.
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Definition 1. Let (M1, w1), (M2, w2) be pointed Θ-models. A binary relation A is
called an asimulation from (M1, w1) to (M2, w2) iff for any i, j such that {i, j} = {1, 2},
any v ∈ Wi, s, t ∈ Wj , any propositional letter p ∈ Θ the following conditions hold:
A ⊆ (W1 ×W2) ∪ (W2 ×W1)(s-type)
w1 A w2(elem)
(v A s ∧ v ∈ Vi(p))⇒ s ∈ Vj(p)))(s-atom)
(v A s ∧ s Rj t)⇒ ∃u ∈Wi(v Ri u ∧ t A u ∧ u A t)(s-back)
Intuitionistic propositional formulas are known to be preserved under asimulations.
More precisely, if (M1, w1), and (M2, w2) are pointed Θ-models and A is an asimu-
lation from (M1, w1) to (M2, w2), then Th
+
IL(M1, w1) ⊆ Th
+
IL(M2, w2). Moreover,
preservation under asimulations is known to semantically characterize IL as a fragment
of classical first-order logic, see [16] for the proof.
Asimulations are defined as an intuitionistic version of bisimulations, a well-known
concept from classical modal logic. In fact, bisimulations can be even defined as sym-
metric asimulations. It follows then that if B is a bisimulation between (M1, w1) and
(M2, w2) then B is an asimulation both from (M1, w1) to (M2, w2) and from (M2, w2)
to (M1, w1). Further, given a pair of pointed Θ-models (M1, w1) and (M2, w2) and a
bisimulation B between them, we get that ThIL(M1, w1) = ThIL(M2, w2).
Asimulation is not the only concept from which bisimulation arises as its symmetric
version; another (and more traditional) notion of this kind would be simulation which
is defined as follows:
Definition 2. Let (M1, w1), (M2, w2) be pointed Θ-models. A binary relation Z
is called an simulation from (M1, w1) to (M2, w2) iff for any v, u ∈ W1, s ∈ W2,
any propositional letter p ∈ Θ the condition (elem) holds together with the following
conditions:
Z ⊆ (W1 ×W2)(type)
(v Z s ∧ v ∈ V1(p))⇒ s ∈ V2(p))(atom)
(v Z s ∧ v R1 u)⇒ ∃t ∈ W2(s R2 t ∧ u Z t)(forth)
Note that in the definition of asimulation one finds stronger versions of clauses (type)
and (atom), hence the labels (s-type) and (s-atom). The label (s-back) also indicates
a strengthening of a more traditional back-clause (given that the symmetry of A is not
guaranteed).
Simulations are clearly related to homomorphisms, which we define, a la [3], as
follows:
Definition 3. Let M1, M2 be Θ-models. A function h : W1 → W2 is called a
homomorphism from M1 to M2 iff for any v, u ∈ W1, any propositional letter p ∈ Θ
the following conditions hold:
v ∈ V1(p)⇒ h(v) ∈ V2(p)(atom)
v R1 u⇒ h(v) R2 h(u)(hom)
It is clear that the main difference between simulations and homomorphisms is that
the latter are functions while the former are relations. We will see in the next section
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that a sort of connection between the two can be established and this fact is important
for our result.
A stronger version of asimulation in the context of intuitionistic logic would be an
IL-embedding defined as follows:
Definition 4. Let M1, M2 be Θ-models. A function h : W1 → W2 is called an IL-
embedding of M1 into M2 iff h is an injective homomorphism from M1 to M2, and
for all v, u ∈W1 it is true that
ThIL(M1, v) = ThIL(M2, h(v))(theories)
v R1 u⇔ h(v) R2 h(u)(s-hom)
It is easy to notice that whenever f is an IL-embedding of M1 into M2, we have
that M2(f(W )) 4IL M2. Also M1 is obviously isomorphic to M2(f(W )), so that
replacing M2(f(W )) with a copy of M1 changes nothing. Therefore, whenever there
exists is an IL-embedding of M1 into M2 we may assume that M1 4IL M2
3. Intuitionistic unravellings and saturated models
In this section, we treat some less immediate properties of intuitionistic logic. We
start by introducing a further piece of notation. If (o1, . . . , on) is an n-tuple of objects
of any nature, then we will denote it with o¯n.
Unravelling Kripke models is another well-known item from classical modal logic.
Here we adapt it to the intuitionistic setting. For a given intuitionistic pointed Kripke
Θ-model (M, w), the model Munw = 〈W
un
w , R
un
w , V
un
w 〉, called the intuitionistic unrav-
elling of M around w is defined as follows.
• Wunw = {u¯n ∈W
n | u1 = w, (∀i < n)(wi R wi+1)};
• Runw is the reflexive and transitive closure of the following relation: {(s, t) ∈W
2 | (∃u ∈W )(t = (s, u))};
• For arbitrary p ∈ Θ, we have V unw (p) = {u¯n ∈W
un
w | un ∈ V (p)}.
The following lemma sums up the basic facts about intuitionistic unravellings:
Lemma 1. Let (M, w) be a pointed Θ-model. Then:
(1) Munw is a Θ-model;
(2) Runw is antisymmetric;
(3) (Munw , w) is bisimilar to (M, w);
(4) ThIL(M, vk) = ThIL(M, v¯k) for any v¯k ∈Wunw ;
(5) ThIL(M, u¯n) = ThIL(M, v¯k) for any u¯n, v¯k ∈Wunw whenever un = vk.
Proof. By definition, Runw is reflexive and transitive. Moreover, we note that for arbi-
trary w¯k, v¯n ∈Wunw we have
w¯k R
un
w v¯n ⇔ k ≤ n ∧ w¯k = v¯k.
Therefore, to show antisymmetry, assume that for a given w¯k, v¯n ∈Wunw we have
w¯k R
un
w v¯n ∧ v¯n R
un
w w¯k.
By the above biconditional it immediately follows that k ≤ n ∧ n ≤ k so that we have
k = n and, further, that w¯k = v¯k. Therefore, we get w¯k = v¯n and thus R
un
w is shown
to be antisymmetric.
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To show monotonicity of V unw w.r.t. R
un
w , assume that for some w¯k, v¯n ∈ W
un
w we
have w¯k R
un
w v¯n. Then we have both k ≤ n and w¯k = v¯k, so that, in particular, we get
wk = vk. Further, by definition of W
un
w we have that
vk R vk+1 R, . . . , R vn−1 R vn,
whence, by monotonicity of V w.r.t. R, it follows that for every p ∈ Θ, if vk ∈ V (p),
then vn ∈ V (p). It remains to notice that, by definition of V
un
w we have both
w¯k ∈ V
un
w (p)⇔ wk ∈ V (p)⇔ vk ∈ V (p),
(by wk = vk) and
v¯n ∈ V
un
w (p)⇔ vn ∈ V (p),
whence we obtain that v¯n ∈ V unw (p), whenever w¯k ∈ V
un
w (p).
As for the bisimulation B between (Munw , w) and (M, w), it can be defined as follows:
B := {(wn, w¯n), (w¯n, wn) | (∃k ≥ 0)(w R
un
w wn)}.
Parts 4 and 5 then follow from this definition of bisimulation and preservation of
intuitionistic formulas under asimulations. 
We state here one more lemma on intuitionistic unravellings relevant to our main
result:
Lemma 2. Let (M, w) and (N , u) be pointed Θ-models, and let Z be a simulation
from (Munw , w) to (N , u) such that the left projection of Z is W
un
w (that is to say, Z
is total). Then there exists a homomorphism h : Munw → N such that h(w) = u and
v Z h(v) for every v ∈Wunw .
Proof. Suppose that there is total simulation Z from (Munw , w) to (N , u). We then
define h by induction on the length of v¯n ∈ Wunw . The base case is when v¯n = w
and we set h(w) := u. If n = k + 1, then h(v¯k) must be already defined by induction
hypothesis, and we must also have v¯k Z h(v¯k). Also, we have v¯k R
un
w v¯k+1. But then
by condition (forth), there must be some s ∈ U such that h(v¯k) Z s and v¯k+1 Z s.
Choose one such s and set h(v¯k+1) := s. Since v¯k, the immediate predecessor of v¯k+1
different from v¯k+1 in M
un
w is unique (naturally, there might be other predecessors of
v¯k+1 but they have to lay below v¯k), h is a function with the required properties. 
Let (Γ,∆) be an IL(Θ)-theory and M be a Θ-model. If v ∈ W , we will say that
(Γ,∆) is finitely IL-satisfiable in M by successors of v iff for all finite Γ′ ⊆ Γ and
∆′ ⊆ ∆, there is a u ∈ W such that v R u and M, u |=IL (Γ′,∆′). A Θ-model M is
called IL-saturated iff for every v ∈ W and for every IL(Θ)-theory (Γ,∆), whenever
(Γ,∆) is finitely IL-satisfiable in M by successors of v, then for some u ∈ W it is true
that v R u andM, u |=IL (Γ,∆). The importance of intuitionistically saturated models
is that among them asimulations can be defined in the following easy and natural way:
Lemma 3. Let (M1, w1), (M2, w2) be pointed Θ-models. If Th
+
IL(M1, w1) ⊆ Th
+
IL(M2, w2)
and both M1 and M2 are intuitionistically saturated, then the relation A such that for
all u ∈ Wi, s ∈Wj if {i, j} = {1, 2}, then
u A s⇔ (Th+IL(Mi, u) ⊆ Th
+
IL(Mj , s))
is an asimulation from (M1, w1) to (M2, w2).
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Proof. The relation A, as defined in the lemma, obviously satisfies conditions (s-type),
(elem), and (s-atom) given in Definition 1. We check the remaining condition, (s-back).
Assume that u A s, so that Th+IL(Mi, u) ⊆ Th
+
IL(Mj , s), and let for some t ∈ Wj
we have s Rj t. Let (Γ
′,∆′) ⊆ ThIL(Mj , t) be finite. Then, of course, we have:
Mj , s 6|=IL
∧
Γ′ →
∨
∆′,
and, by u A s:
Mi, u 6|=IL
∧
Γ′ →
∨
∆′.
The latter means that (Γ′,∆′) must be IL-satisfied by some Ri-successor of u. There-
fore, by intuitionistic saturation of bothM1 andM2, we get that for some v ∈ Wi such
that u Ri w the theory ThIL(Mj , t) is IL-satisfied at (Mi, u). It follows immediately
that
ThIL(Mi, w) = ThIL(Mj , t),
whence
Th+IL(Mi, w) = Th
+
IL(Mj , t),
which, in turn, means that both w A t and t A w. 
4. Abstract intuitionistic logics
An abstract intuitionistic logic L is a pair (L, |=L), where L maps every vocabulary
Θ to the set L(Θ) of Θ-formulas of L and |=L is a binary relation between pointed
models and elements of L(Θ) for some vocabulary Θ such that the following conditions
are satisfied:
• Θ ⊆ Θ′ ⇒ L(Θ) ⊆ L(Θ′).
• If M is a Θ-model and M, w |=L φ, then φ ∈ L(Θ).
• IfM and N are Θ-models, φ ∈ L(Θ) and f is an isomorphism betweenM and
N , then for every w ∈W it is true that:
M, w |=L φ⇔ N , f(w) |=L φ.
• (Expansion). If Θ is a vocabulary, φ ∈ L(Θ), Θ ⊆ Θ′, M is a Θ′-model, and
M ↾ Θ is the reduct of M to Θ, then:
M, w |=L φ⇔M ↾ Θ, w |=L φ.
• (Occurrence). If φ ∈ L(Θ) for some vocabulary , then there is a finite Θφ ⊆ Θ
such that for every Θ′-model M, the relation M |=L φ is defined iff Θφ ⊆ Θ′.
• (Closure). For every vocabulary Θ and all φ, ψ ∈ L(Θ), we have φ→ ψ, φ∧ψ, φ∨ψ ∈ L(Θ),
that is to say, L is closed under intuitionistic implication, conjunction and dis-
junction.
We further define that given a pair of abstract intuitionistic logics L and L′, we say
that L′ extends L and write L E L′ when for all vocabularies Θ and φ ∈ L(Θ) there
exists a ψ ∈ L′(Θ) such that for arbitrary pointed Θ-model (M, w) it is true that:
M, w |=L φ⇔M, w |=L′ ψ.
If both L E L′ and L′ E L holds, then we say that the logics L and L′ are expressively
equivalent and write L ≡ L′.
It is easy to see that intuitionistic propositional logic itself turns out to be an abstract
intuitionistic logic IL = (IL, |=IL) under this definition. It is also obvious that the
above definitions and conventions about intuitionistic theories can be carried over to an
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arbitrary abstract intuitionistic logic L replacing everywhere IL with L, including such
notions as elementary submodel, embedding, saturation of a model, etc. In particular,
since the relation |=L never distinguishes between isomorphic models, the remark after
Definition 4 holds for arbitrary intuitionistic logics L.
In this paper, our specific interest is in the extensions of IL. Since every abstract
intuitionistic logic L extending ILmust have an equivalent for every intuitionistic propo-
sitional formula, we will just assume that for every vocabulary Θ we have IL(Θ) ⊆ L(Θ)
and that for every ϕ ∈ IL(Θ) and every pointed Θ-model (M, w) we have that:
M, w |=L ϕ⇔M, w |=IL ϕ,
so that all the intuitionistic propositional formulas are present in L in their usual form
and with their usual meaning, and whatever other formulas that L may contain are
distinct from the elements of IL(Θ).
We can immediately state the following corollary to Lemma 3 for arbitrary extensions
of IL:
Corollary 1. Let IL E L, and let (M1, w1), (M2, w2) be two pointed intuitionistic
Kripke Θ-models. If Th+IL(M1, w1) ⊆ Th
+
IL(M2, w2) and both M1 and M2 are L-
saturated, then the relation A such that for all u ∈ Wi, s ∈ Wj if {i, j} = {1, 2},
then
u A s⇔ (Th+IL(Mi, u) ⊆ Th
+
IL(Mj , s))
is an asimulation from (M1, w1) to (M2, w2).
To prove this, we just repeat the proof of Lemma 3 using the fact that every L-
saturated model is of course IL-saturated.
Some of the extensions of IL turn out to be better than others in that they have
useful model-theoretic properties. We define some of the relevant properties below.
Definition 5. Let L = (L, |=L) be an abstract intuitionistic logic. Then:
• L is invariant under asimulations, iff for all vocabularies Θ and arbitrary
pointed Θ-models (M1, w1) and (M2, w2), whenever A is an asimulation from
(M1, w1) to (M2, w2), then the inclusion Th
+
L(M1, w1) ⊆ Th
+
L(M2, w2) holds.
• L is intuitionistically compact, iff an arbitrary L(Θ)-theory (Γ,∆) is L-
satisfiable, whenever for every finite Γ′ ⊆ Γ and ∆′ ⊆ ∆, the theory (Γ′,∆′) is
L-satisfiable.
• L has Tarski Union Property (TUP) iff for every L-elementary chain
M0 4L, . . . ,4L Mn 4L, . . .
it is true that:
Mn 4L
⋃
n∈ω
Mn
for all n ∈ ω.
We have mentioned above that in the case of IL invariance under asimulations implies
invariance under bisimulations. The same argument holds in the case of arbitrary
abstract intuitionistic logic L. In other words, the following lemma holds:
Lemma 4. If L is an abstract intuitionistic logic that is invariant under asimulations,
then L is invariant under bisimulations. In other words, for arbitrary vocabulary Θ
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and arbitrary pointed Θ-models (M1, w1) and (M2, w2), if B is bisimulation between
(M1, w1) and (M2, w2), then:
ThL(M1, w1) = ThL(M2, w2).
Moreover if an abstract intuitionistic logic is invariant under asimulations, then
every formula of this logic is monotonic w.r.t. accessibility relation. More precisely,
the following lemma holds:
Lemma 5. If L is an abstract intuitionistic logic that is invariant under asimulations,
then for every pointed Θ-model (M, w), for every v ∈ W such that w R v, and for
every φ ∈ L(Θ) it is true that:
M, w |=L φ⇒M, v |=L φ.
Proof. We define asimulation A from (M, w) to (M, v) setting:
A := {(w, v)} ∪ {(u, u) | u ∈W, v R u}.
The lemma then follows by asimulation invariance of L. 
Note that for Lemma 5 one does not even need to assume that IL E L. The next
lemma sums up some well-known facts about IL:
Lemma 6. IL is invariant under asimulations, intuitionistically compact and has TUP.
Proof. Invariance under asimulations follows from the main result of [16]. The intu-
itionistic compactness of IL is a well-known fact and is established in many places, see
e.g. [4, Theorem 2.46]. The proof of TUP runs along the lines of standard proof of
TUP for modal formalisms (cf [20, Observation 5]); we briefly sketch it here.
We need to show that if ϕ ∈ IL(Θ), n ∈ ω and w ∈ Wn, then
Mn, w |=IL ϕ⇔
⋃
n∈ω
Mn, w |=IL ϕ;
this is done by induction on ϕ and the only non-trivial case is when ϕ = ψ → χ. If
Mn, w 6|=IL ψ → χ, then there is a v ∈Wn such thatw Rn v andMn, v |=IL ({ψ}, {χ}).
But then, by induction hypothesis we must have
⋃
n∈ωMn, v |=IL ({ψ}, {χ}) and we
also have w (
⋃
n∈ω Rn) v so that
⋃
n∈ωMn, w 6|=IL ψ → χ. In the other direction,
assume that
⋃
n∈ωMn, w 6|=IL ψ → χ. Then, for some v ∈
⋃
n∈ωWn such that
w (
⋃
n∈ω Rn)v it is true that
⋃
n∈ωMn, v |=IL ({ψ}, {χ}). But then, for some k ≥ n,
we must have both w, v ∈ Wk and w Rk v, so that we getMk, w 6|=IL ψ → χ. By obvi-
ous transitivity of 4IL we get then thatMn 4IL Mk, whenceMn, w 6|=IL ψ → χ. 
Our main theorem is then that no proper extension of IL displays the combination
of useful properties established in Lemma 6. In other words, we are going to establish
the following:
Theorem 1. Let L be an abstract intuitionistic logic. If IL E L and L is invariant
under asimulations, intuitionistically compact, and has the TUP, then IL ≡ L.
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5. The proof of Theorem 1
Before we start with the proof, we need one more piece of notation. If L is an
abstract intuitionistic logic, Θ a vocabulary, and Γ ⊆ L(Θ), then we let ModL(Θ,Γ)
denote the class of pointed Θ-models (N , u) such that for every φ ∈ Γ it is true that:
N , u |=L φ.
If Γ = {φ} for some φ ∈ L(Θ) then instead ofModL(Θ,Γ) we simply writeModL(Θ, φ).
We now start by establishing a couple of technical facts first:
Proposition 1. Let L be a almost strong S-closed abstract intuitionistic logic extend-
ing IL. Suppose that IL 6≡ L. Then, there are φ ∈ L(Θφ) and pointed Θφ-models
(M1, w1), (M2, w2) such that Th
+
IL(M1, w1) ⊆ Th
+
IL(M2, w2) while M1, w1 |=L φ
and M2, w2 6|=L φ.
Proof. Suppose that for an arbitrary φ ∈ L(Θφ) we have shown that:
(i) ModL(Θφ, φ) =
⋃
(N ,u)∈ModL(Θφ,φ)
ModL(Θφ, Th
+
IL(N , u)),
Let (N , u) ∈ ModL(Θφ, φ) be arbitrary. The above implies that every Θφ-model
of Th+IL(N , u) must be a model of φ. But then the theory (Th
+
IL(N , u), {φ}) is L-
unsatisfiable. By the intuitionistic compactness of L, for some finite Ψ(N ,u) ⊆ Th
+
IL(N , u)
(and we can pick a unique one using the Axiom of Choice), the theory (Ψ(N ,u), {φ}) is
L-unsatisfiable. Hence,
∧
Ψ(N ,u) logically implies φ in L. Then, given (i), we get that
(ii) ModL(Θφ, φ) =
⋃
(N ,u)∈ModL(Θφ,φ)
ModL(Θφ,Ψ(N ,u)).
However, this means that the theory ({φ}, {
∧
Ψ(N ,u) | (N , u) ∈ ModL(Θφ, φ)}) is L-
unsatisfiable and by (i), for some finite Γ ⊆ {
∧
Ψ(N ,u) | (N , u) ∈ ModL(Θφ, φ)}, the
theory ({φ},Γ) is L-unsatisfiable. This means that ModL(Θφ, φ) ⊆ ModL(Θφ,
∨
Γ).
So, using (ii), since clearly ModL(Θφ,
∨
Γ) ⊆
⋃
(N ,u)∈ModL(Θφ,φ)
ModL(Θφ,Ψ(N ,u)),
we get that:
(iii) ModL(Θφ, φ) =ModL(Θφ,
∨
Γ).
Now,
∨
Γ is a perfectly good formula of IL(Θφ) involving only finitary conjunctions
and disjunctions. So we have shown that every φ ∈ L(Θφ) is just an intuitionistic
Θφ-formula and hence that L ≡ IL which is in contradiction with the hypothesis of the
proposition.
Therefore, (i) must fail for at least one φ ∈ L(Θφ), and clearly, for this φ it can only
fail if ⋃
(N ,u)∈ModL(Θφ,φ)
ModL(Θφ, Th
+
IL(N , u)) 6⊆ModL(Θφ, φ).
But the latter means that for some pointed intuitionistic Θφ-model (M1, w1) such
that M1, w1 |=L φ there is another Θφ-model (M2, w2) such that both M2, w2 6|=L φ
and Th+IL(M1, w1) is satisfied at (M2, w2). The latter means, in turn, that we have
Th+IL(M1, w1) ⊆ Th
+
IL(M2, w2) as desired. 
Assume M is a Θ-model. We define that ΘM is Θ ∪ {q+w , q
−
w | w ∈ W} such that
Θ ∩ {q+w , q
−
w | w ∈ W} = ∅, and we define that [M] = (W,R, [V ]) is the ΘM-model,
such that W and R are just borrowed from M and [V ] coincides with V on elements
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of Θ, whereas for arbitrary v, w ∈W we set that v ∈ [V ](q+w ) iff w R v and v /∈ [V ](q
−
w )
iff v R w.
Lemma 7. Let L be a bisimulation invariant abstract intuitionistic logic extending IL,
let (M, w) be a pointed Θ-model, and let (N , v) another pointed ΘMunw -model. Assume
that ThL(N , v) = ThL([Munw ], w). Then there exists an L-embedding f of [M
un
w ] into
N such that f(w) = v.
Proof. Consider the relation Z relating w only to v, and every other element u¯k ∈ Wunw
to the worlds in N that L-satisfy ThL([Munw ], u¯k). We prove that such Z is a total sim-
ulation from ([Munw ], w) to (N , v). Indeed, conditions (type) and (atom) are obviously
satisfied. We treat condition (forth).
Assume that v¯k Z v
′ and that v¯k R
un
w v¯n (then n ≥ k). By definition of Z we have
then ThL(N , v
′) = ThL([M
un
w ], v¯k), and also, since w is the root ofM
un
w , we have, by
Lemma 5 and invariance of L under asimulations that
Th+L([M
un
w ], w) ⊆ Th
+
L([M
un
w ], v¯k) = Th
+
L(N , v
′).
By definition of [Munw ] and closure of L w.r.t. intuitionistic implication, we have that
the set:
Γv¯n = {q
+
v¯n
→ φ | φ ∈ Th+L([M
un
w ], v¯n)} ∪ {ψ → q
−
v¯n
| ψ ∈ Th−L([M
un
w ], v¯n)}
is a subset of Th+L([M
un
w ], w), thus also of Th
+
L(N , v
′). We also know that, by v¯k R
un
w v¯n,
and by the fact that the theory ({q+v¯n}{q
−
v¯n}) is L-satisfied at ([M
un
w ], v¯n), we have:
[Munw ], v¯k 6|=L q
+
v¯n
→ q−v¯n .
Therefore, N , v′ 6|=L q
+
v¯n → q
−
v¯n . So take some v
′′ ∈ U such that v′ RN v′′ and
({q+v¯n}{q
−
v¯n}) is L-satisfied at (N , v
′′). By Γv¯n ⊆ Th
+
L(N , v
′), we also have that
Γv¯n ⊆ Th
+
L(N , v
′′), so that ThL(N , v
′′) = ThL([M
un
w ], v¯n), whence we get that v¯n Z v
′′
and condition (forth) is verified.
By Lemma 2, there must be then a homomorphism f from [Munw ] to N such that
v¯n Z f(v¯n) for all v¯n ∈ Wunw , so, in particular, w Z f(w) but by definition Z only
relates w to v, hence f(w) = v.
For this f , we get condition (theories) immediately by definition of Z. To establish
the injectivity of f assume that v¯n, u¯k ∈Wunw are such that v¯n 6= u¯k. Then, by Lemma
1, either v¯n is not an R
un
w -successor of u¯k or u¯k is not an R
un
w -successor of v¯n. If the
first, f(u¯k) L-satisfies q
+
u¯k
in N , while f(v¯n) does not, so f(u¯k) 6= f(v¯n). If the second,
then a symmetric thing happens with q+v¯n .
Finally, if, for some v¯n, u¯k ∈ W
un
w , f(v¯n) is a successor of f(u¯k) in N , we must
have that N , f(v¯n) L q
+
u¯k
, so that [Munw ], v¯n L q
+
u¯k
, which means by definition of the
valuation of q+u¯k that v¯n is an R
un
w -successor of u¯k in [M
un
w ] so that condition (s-hom)
is verified as well. 
Proposition 2. Let (M, w) be a pointed Θ-model and let L be an abstract intuitionistic
logic which is invariant under asimulations, intuitionistically compact, has TUP and
extends IL. Then there is an L-saturated pointed Θ-model (N , s) such that w ∈ U and
ThL(M, w) = ThL(N , w).
Proof. Consider (Munw , w). By Lemma 1.3, (M
un
w , w) is bisimilar to (M, w), therefore,
by Lemma 4 and invariance of L under asimulations, we get that ThL(M, w) = ThL(Munw , w).
Consider then [Munw ] and assume v¯k ∈ W
un
w . For a given v¯k ∈W
un
w , we will denote the
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family of all L(Θ[Munw ])-theories which are finitely L-satisfiable in [M
un
w ] by successors
of v¯k by FinSatv¯k . For every v¯k ∈ W
un
w and every (Γ,∆) ∈ FinSatv¯k we add to
Θ[Munw ] a fresh pair of propositional letters r
+
Γ and r
−
∆. Call the resulting vocabulary
Θ′. Consider next the following L(Θ′)-theory (Ξ, Th−L ([M
un
w ], w)), where:
Ξ =Th+L([M
un
w ], w)∪
∪ {r+Γ → φ, ψ → r
−
∆, (r
+
Γ → r
−
∆)→ q
−
v¯k
| (Γ,∆) ∈ FinSatv¯k , φ ∈ Γ, ψ ∈ ∆, v¯k ∈ W
un
w },
(Ξ, Th−L([M
un
w ], w)) is itself finitely L-satisfiable, since given finite Ξ0 ⊆ Ξ and Ω0 ⊆ Th
−
L([M
un
w ], w),
we know wlog that:
Ξ0 = Γ ∪ T (S(Γ1,∆1))∪, . . . ,∪T (S(Γn,∆n)),
where Γ is a finite subtheory of Th+L([M
un
w ], w), (Γ1,∆1) ∈ FinSatv¯k1 , . . . , (Γn,∆n) ∈ FinSatv¯kn ,
with v¯k1 , . . . , v¯kn ∈ W
un
w , for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n S(Γi,∆i) is a finite subset of (Γi,∆i) and,
again for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
T (S(Γi,∆i)) = {r
+
Γi
→ φ, ψ → r−∆i , (r
+
Γi
→ r−∆i)→ q
−
v¯ki
| φ, ψ ∈ S(Γi,∆i)}.
By definition of FinSat, every S(Γi,∆i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n will be L-satisfied in some
v(S(Γi,∆i)) ∈W
un
w such that v¯ki R
un
w v(S(Γi,∆i)). It is easy to see then, that every such
(Ξ0,Ω0) will be L-satisfied in the extension of ([Munw ], w), where for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n
the propositional letters r+Γi , r
−
∆i
are identified with q+
v(S(Γi,∆i))
, q−
v(S(Γi,∆i))
, respectively.
Therefore, by the intuitionistic compactness of L, (Ξ, Th−L ([M
un
w ], w)) itself is L-
satisfiable. Let (M′1, w1) be a pointed Θ
′-model L-satisfying (Ξ, Th−L ([M
un
w ], w)), and
we may assume that w1 is the root ofM′1 (if not, throw away every world which is not
accessible from w1 in M
′
1). Now, let M1 be the reduct of M
′
1 to Θ[Munw ]. We know
that (M1, w1) L-satisfies ThL([Munw ], w), therefore, by Lemma 1.3, ((M1)
un
w1
, w1) also
L-satisfies ThL([Munw ], w) and by Lemma 7, there must be an embedding f of [M
un
w ]
into (M1)unw1 with f(w) = w1. We now prove the following:
Claim. If v¯k ∈W
un
w and a L(Θ[Munw ])-theory (Γ,∆) is finitely L-satisfiable in [M
un
w ]
by successors of v¯k, then there is an u ∈ (W1)unw1 such that f(v¯k) (R1)
un
w1
u and (Γ,∆)
is L-satisfied at ((M1)unw1 , u).
Indeed, we have (Γ,∆) ∈ FinSatv¯k , and we also have [M
un
w ], v¯k 6|=L q
−
v¯k
, hence
(M1)unw1 , f(v¯k) 6|=L q
−
v¯k
. Since (M1)unw1 is an intuitionistic unravelling, f(v¯k) is in fact
some u¯r ∈ (W1)unw1 . By Lemma 1.4 we must have then M1, ur 6|=L q
−
v¯k
, therefore, by
Expansion, M′1, ur 6|=L q
−
v¯k
. Since w1 is the root of M′1 and (Ξ, Th
−
L([M
un
w ], w))
is L-satisfied at (M′1, w1), we must also have M
′
1, ur |=L Ξ, and, in particular,
M′1, ur |=L (r
+
Γ → r
−
∆) → q
−
v¯k
. Therefore, there must be a successor u′ to ur in M′1
such that ({r+Γ }, {r
−
∆}) is L-satisfied at (M
′
1, u
′). Since we will also haveM′1, u
′ |=L Ξ,
this means that (Γ,∆) will be L-satisfied at (M′1, u
′) as well. Again by Expansion, we
get that (Γ,∆) will be L-satisfied at (M1, u′) and further, by Lemma 1.4 , that (Γ,∆)
will be L-satisfied at ((M1)
un
w1
, (u¯r, u
′)). By ur R1 u
′, we have that (u¯r, u
′) ∈ (W1)
un
w1
and u¯r (R1)
un
w1
(u¯r, u
′). Therefore, setting u := (u¯r, u
′), we get our Claim verified.
Observe further, that by the remark after Definition 4, the existence of the above-
defined embedding f means that we may assume that [Munw ] 4L (M1)
un
w1
and identify
w1 with w. Repeating this construction ω times and taking Θ[Munw ]-reducts of the
resulting models so that all of them are in the same vocabulary, we obtain an infinite
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chain of L-elementary submodels of the following form:
[Munw ] 4L (M1)
un
w 4L, . . . ,4L (Mn)
un
w 4L, . . . ,
with w being the root of every model in the chain. To simplify notation and achieve
the uniformity of subscripts, we rename [Munw ] as N0, and for i ≥ 1, rename (Mi)
un
w
as Ni. We consider then
⋃
i∈ωNi. Since L has TUP, we know that for every j ∈ ω we
have
(1) Nj 4L
⋃
i∈ω
Ni.
We claim that
⋃
i∈ω Ni is an L-saturated Θ[Munw ]-model. Indeed, assume that (Γ,∆)
is an L(Θ[Munw ])-theory which is finitely L-satisfiable among successors of some v in⋃
i∈ωNi. Then for any finite (Γ0,∆0) ⊆ (Γ,∆) we will have
⋃
i∈ω
Ni, v 6|=L
∧
Γ0 →
∨
∆0.
Then choose j ∈ ω such that Nj is the first model in the chain, where v occurs. By
(1), we will have:
Nj , v 6|=L
∧
Γ0 →
∨
∆0
for any finite (Γ0,∆0) ⊆ (Γ,∆). Therefore, (Γ,∆) will be finitely L-satisfiable in Nj
by successors of v and by the respective version of our Claim above, this means that
there is a successor v′ to v in Nj+1 such that (Γ,∆) is L-satisfied at (Nj+1, v′). But
then, again by (1), we get that (Γ,∆) is also L-satisfied at (
⋃
i∈ωNi, v
′).
Since
⋃
i∈ωNi is therefore shown to be an L-saturated Θ[Munw ]-model, then setting
N to be Θ-reduct of
⋃
i∈ωNi, we immediately get that N is L-saturated. Also, by (1)
and the fact that Munw is the Θ-reduct of [M
un
w ] we get that:
ThL(M
un
w , w) = ThL(N , w).
Therefore, by Lemma 1.4, we get that ThL(M, w) = ThL(N , w) and thus we are
done. 
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 1. Indeed, assume the hypothesis
of the theorem, and assume, for contradiction, that L 6≡ IL. By Proposition 1,
there must be φ ∈ L(Θφ) and pointed intuitionistic Θφ-models (M1, w1), (M2, w2)
such that Th+IL(M1, w1) ⊆ Th
+
IL(M2, w2) while M1, w1 |=L φ and M2, w2 6|=L φ.
By Proposition 2, take L-saturated Θφ-models N1 and N2 such that wi ∈ Ui and
ThL(Mi, wi) = ThL(Ni, wi) for i ∈ {0, 1}. We will have then, of course, that
N1, w1 |=L φ, butN2, w2 6|=L φ. On the other hand, we will still have Th
+
IL(N1, w1) ⊆ Th
+
IL(N2, w2),
whence by Corollary 1 there must be an asimulation A from (N1, w1) to (N2, w2), but
then, since L is invariant under asimulations, we must also have Th+L(N1, w1) ⊆ Th
+
L(N2, w2).
Now, since φ ∈ Th+L(N1, w1), we can see that φ ∈ Th
+
L(N2, w2), so that N2, w2 |=L φ,
which is a contradiction.
6. A topological approach to the main theorem
There is a topological reading of our result. This sort of take on Lindstro¨m theorems
has been explored by some authors, in particular, Caicedo (see [5]). One of the fun-
damental interests of such an approach is that logical compactness properties become
topological compactness properties. To see this, for each vocabulary Θ, we must first
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define a topology (to be called the intuitionistic topology for Θ −indeed, the reference
to Θ will be dropped when the context makes it clear that some Θ has been fixed) on
the the space of all intuitionistic pointed Θ-models (call it S for the purposes of this
section). Abstract logics will then roughly correspond to topologies on such space. We
will assume that the reader is familiar with the basic notions of general topology that
can be acquired in a place like [13].
We start by introducing a closed base B for our topology. The elements of B have the
formMod(φ) for some formula φ in the usual language {→,∧,∨,⊥,⊤} of intuitionistic
propositional logic. B is a closed base for a topology on S because for any two A,B ∈ B
there isW ∈ B such that A∪B =W : givenMod(φ) andMod(ψ), considerMod(φ∨ψ).
The intuitionistic topology is just the topology induced by this base, that is, take as
closed collections arbitrary intersections of elements of B.
Now we may observe that we ended up with a topology where the closed collections
have the form Mod(T ) for some intuitionistic set of formulas T . Denote 2IL(Θ) with
℘(Fmla). In particular, given a subclass A of the space, if we denote by Th+IL(A) the
collection of all intuitionistic formulas holding in every member of A, then A−, the
closure of A in our topology, is just
⋂
T∈℘(Fmla)
A⊆Mod(T )
Mod(T ) =Mod(Th+IL(A)).
The space is not normal (i.e., it is not the case that for any two disjoint closed
classes A,B there exist disjoint open classes U, V containing A and B respectively), for
let Mod(T ) ∩Mod(U) = ∅ for two intuitionistic theories such that Mod(T ) 6= ∅ and
Mod(U) 6= ∅. Moreover, suppose thatMod(T ) ⊆ S\Mod(T ′), andMod(U) ⊆ S\Mod(U ′)
for some intuitionistic theories T ′, U ′. Now take any structure (M, w) ∈ S \Mod(T ′)
and (N , v) ∈ S \Mod(U ′), but this means that for some φ ∈ T ′ and ψ ∈ U ′ we have
that φ and ψ fail at (M, w) and (N , v) respectively, so neither φ nor ψ are theorems of
intuitionistic logic. But intuitionistic logic has the disjunction property (⊢ φ ∨ ψ only
if either ⊢ φ or ⊢ ψ), so in fact there is some (M′, w′) ∈ S such that φ ∨ ψ fails, which
implies that (M′, w′) ∈ (S \Mod(T ′)) ∩ (S \Mod(U ′)).
The space is not regular (i.e., it is not the case that closed classes and exterior
points may be separated by disjoint open classes). Take any Mod(T0) 6= ∅ and
(M, w) /∈ Mod(T0), i.e., M, w 6|=IL φ for some φ ∈ T0. Consider further arbitrary
open classes S \Mod(T1) and S \Mod(T2) such that Mod(T0) ⊆ S \Mod(T1) and
(M, w) ∈ S \Mod(T2). Hence, taking (N , v) ∈ Mod(T0), it must be in S \Mod(T1).
So there are ψ ∈ T1 and θ ∈ T2 such that N , v 6|=IL ψ and M, w 6|=IL θ. By the
disjunction property, we have (C, u) falsifying both ψ and θ, hence the intersection
(S \Mod(T1)) ∩ (S \Mod(T2)) cannot be empty.
The space is compact because each family of closed sets which has the finite intersec-
tion property has a non-empty intersection (this is just the content of the compactness
theorem in intuitionistic logic−hence Rasiowa’s name for this theorem), which is equiv-
alent to saying that every covering of the space can be reduced to a finite subcovering.
Moreover, the space is connected. To see this we again use the disjunction property
of intuitionistic logic. For suppose that S = A∪B for separated subsets A,B 6= ∅. But
then Mod(Th+IL(A)) ∩ B = ∅ and Mod(Th
+
IL(B)) ∩ A = ∅. Now take (M, w) ∈ A, so
it must be the case that some φ ∈ Th+IL(A) fails in (M, w). On the other hand, taking
(N , v) ∈ B, we obtain an (N , v) where some ψ ∈ Th+IL(B) fails. By the disjunction
property, there is a structure (M′, w′) where both φ and ψ fail, which means that
(M′, w′) is in neither the closure of A nor the closure of B, which is impossible given
that S = A ∪B.
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The space is not Hausdorff because given two models satisfying exactly the same
intuitionistic formulas (that is, they belong to exactly the same closed classes of the
topology) but which are not isomorphic, so they are distinct, we have a violation of
the definition of a Hausdorff space: given two distinct points in the space we can find
disjoint neighborhoods of each of them. In fact, we get with this example that the
space is not T1: there are distinct points x, y such that for every open classes A,B of
the intuitionistic topology, x ∈ A only if y ∈ A and y ∈ B only if x ∈ B. Even worse,
the space is not even T0: by the same example we have got points x, y such that there is
no neighborhood of x where y doesn’t belong. Naturally, the latter observation suffices
to refute the earlier properties.
Now we look at a related topology that plays an important role in our main result.
Consider the collection SB∗ containing all collections of the form S \Mod(φ,⊥) and
S \ Mod(⊤, ψ) for all intutionistic formulas φ and ψ. This forms an open subbase
for a topology on S. The open base B∗ generated from SB∗ is just all classes of the
form Mod(φ, ψ) for intuitionistic formulas φ and ψ (this collection simply contains all
finite intersections of members of SB∗). Open classes in this topology are of the form⋃
φ∈Φ,ψ∈ΨMod(φ, ψ) for some collections Φ,Ψ of formulas.
A topological space is said to be strongly S-closed if every family of open sets with
the finite intersection property has a non-empty intersection [7]. Moreover, we will say
that a space is almost strongly S-closed if every family of basic open sets with the finite
intersection property has a non-empty intersection. The topology is almost strongly S-
closed this follows from the fact that every cover of S by members of the subbase has a
finite subcover . The latter comes from the intuitionistic compactness of intuitionistic
logic. Moreover, the topology is uniform, we can obtain it from what we will call
(borrowing from [5]) the canonical uniformity, namely the uniformity generated by the
base formed by the subclass U ⊆ S × S containing:
UΦ = {((M, w), (N , v)) | M, w |=IL φ iff N , v |=IL φ, φ ∈ Φ}
for each finite collection Φ of formulas. Now, the canonical uniformity generates
the previously defined topology of intuitionistic theories. To see this, first note that
UΦ[(M, w)] = {(N , v) | ((M, w), (N , v)) ∈ UΦ} coincides with
(S \ {(N , v) | N , v |=IL (
∨
Φ−,⊥)}) ∩ (S \ {(N , v) | N , v |=IL (⊤,
∧
Φ+)})
where Φ+ = {φ ∈ Φ | M, w |=IL φ} while Φ− = {φ ∈ Φ | M, w 6|=IL φ}. Now,
given an open class
⋃
φ∈Φ,ψ∈ΨMod(φ, ψ), if (M, w) ∈
⋃
φ∈Φ,ψ∈ΨMod(φ, ψ), then for
some φ, ψ, we have that (M, w) ∈Mod(φ, ψ). But then U{φ,ψ}[(M, w)] ⊆Mod(φ, ψ).
Hence, open classes of the previously considered topology are open in the topology
of the canonical uniformity. Conversely, if O is an open class of the topology of the
canonical uniformity, we can see that O =
⋃
(M,w)∈O,
UΦ[(M,w)]⊆O,
UΦ∈U
UΦ[(M, w)]. But the latter
is a union of open classes in the previously considered topology, as we have observed
above.
Another space that may be interesting to explore is the quotient space obtained
from the following equivalence relation on S: x ≈ y iff x, y belong to exactly the same
closed classes of the intuitionistic topology. Now consider the quotient topology for
the natural projection pi : S −→ S\ ≈. This topology takes as the closed classes all
those subclasses U of S such that pi−1[U ] is closed in the intuitionistic topology. So
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the closed classes in this topology have the form {[(M, w)] | (M, w) ∈ Mod(T )} for
some intuitionistic set of formulas T .
The quotient space is T0: for if [(M, w)] 6= [(N , v)] then we have some φ such that
(M, w) ∈Mod(φ) while (N , v) /∈Mod(φ), so [(M, w)] ∈ {[(M, w)] | (M, w) ∈Mod(φ)}
whereas [(N , v)] /∈ {[(N , v)] | (N , v) ∈ Mod(φ)}, so there is a neighborhood of one of
the points not containing the other.
On the other hand, the space is not Hausdorff: take [(M, w)] 6= [(N , v)], and notice
that for every open classes U, V such that [(M, w)] ∈ U and [(N , v)] ∈ V we have that,
for some sets of intuitionistic formulas T,O, we have that U = (S\ ≈)\{[(C, u)] | (C, u) ∈Mod(T )}
and V = (S\ ≈)\{[(C, u)] | (C, u) ∈Mod(O)}. So (M, w) /∈Mod(φ) and (N , v) /∈Mod(ψ)
for some φ ∈ T and ψ ∈ U , so using the disjunction property, we get some (M′, w′)
such that (M′, w′) /∈Mod(φ ∨ ψ), which means that [(M′, w′)] ∈ U ∩ V .
Finally, the main theorem of this paper may be read as: for any vocabulary, the
intuitionistic topology is the finest topology such that (i) its closed sets are closed under
asimulations, (ii) it has the Tarski-Union property and (iii) the subbase of the topology
of the canonical uniformity is such that every open cover of the space by members of
the subbase has a finite subcover.
7. Conclusion
We have succeeded in establishing a Lindstro¨m characterization of intuitionistic
propositional logic over intuitionistic models involving the properties of intuitionistic
compactness, the TUP and preservation under asimulations. In future work we will
show how this characterization can be extended to the case of predicate intuitionistic
logic. Our work, of course, opens a world of new questions. A particularly immediate
one is to find some other combination of interesting model theoretic properties that
implies the three mentioned properties and would therefore give us a new intuitionistic
Lindstro¨m theorem.
On the other hand, it would be nice to work out the details of what is the algebraic
content of our result via duality theory. Pointed intuitionistic models are dual to
Heyting matrices (that is, pairs formed by a Heyting algebra and a filter on such
algebra), so the work reduces to investigate the algebraic counterparts of the TUP and
the preservation under asimulations.
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